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Abstract—With the rapid popularity of blockchain, decentral-
ized human intelligence tasks (HITs) are proposed to crowdsource
human knowledge without relying on vulnerable third-party
platforms. However, the inherent limits of blockchain cause
decentralized HITs to face a few “new” challenges. For example,
the confidentiality of solicited data turns out to be the sine qua
non, though it was an arguably dispensable property in the
centralized setting. To ensure the “new” requirement of data
privacy, existing decentralized HITs use generic zero-knowledge
proof frameworks (e.g., SNARK), but scarcely perform well in
practice, due to the inherently expensive cost of generality.
We present a practical decentralized protocol for HITs, which
also achieves the fairness between requesters and workers. At
the core of our contributions, we avoid the powerful yet highly-
costly generic zk-proof tools and propose a special-purpose
scheme to prove the quality of encrypted data. By various non-
trivial statement reformations, proving the quality of encrypted
data is reduced to efficient verifiable decryption, thus making
decentralized HITs practical. Along the way, we rigorously define
the ideal functionality of decentralized HITs and then prove the
security due to the ideal/real paradigm.
We further instantiate our protocol to implement a system
called Dragoon1, an instance of which is deployed atop Ethereum
to facilitate an image annotation task used by ImageNet. Our
evaluations demonstrate its practicality: the on-chain handling
cost of Dragoon is even less than the handling fee of Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk for the same ImageNet HIT.
Index Terms—crowdsourcing; human intelligence task; decen-
tralized application; blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing empowers open collaborations over the In-
ternet. A remarkable case is to gather knowledge through
human intelligence tasks (HITs). In HITs, a requester specifies
a few questions which some workers can answer, such that the
requester obtains answers and the workers get paid. Since HITs
were firstly minted in Amazon’s MTurk [1], they have been
widely adopted, e.g., to build training datasets for machine
learning [2–4]. In particular, ImageNet [5], an impactful deep
learning benchmark, was created through thousands of HITs
and laid stepping stones for the deep learning paradigm.
Nevertheless, both academia and industry [6–15] realize the
broader adoption of HITs is severely impeded in practice, as
a result of the serious security concerns of free-riding and
false-reporting: (i) on the one hand, HITs suffer from low-
quality answers, as misconducting workers or even bots would
try to reap rewards without making real efforts [7, 8]; (ii) on
the other hand, quite many requesters in the wild arbitrarily
1In German history, a dragoon was a lancer that was particularly light and
firearmed. As an analog, Dragoon is a super lightweight and highly robust
system that enables the modern freelancers to enjoy decentralized HITs.
reject answers in order to collect data without paying [14]
through manipulating some real-world guidelines set forth for
the requester to reject low-quality answers [9–11].
Free-riding and false-reporting become the major obstacles
to the broader adoption of HITs participated by mutually
distrustful users [14], and therefore raise a basic requirement
of fairness in HITs, namely, the requester pays a worker, iff
the worker puts forth a qualified answer. Many studies [6–12]
characterize the purpose and then design proper incentives and
payment policies for the needed fairness.
Notwithstanding, most traditional solutions to fairness [6–
12] fully trust in a de facto centralized third-party platform to
enforce the payment policies for the basic fairness requirement
in HITs. Unfortunately, putting trust in a single party turns
out to be vulnerable and elusive in practice, as a reflection
of tremendous compromises, outages and misfeasance of real-
world crowdsourcing platforms [14–16]. For instance, one of
the most popular crowdsourcing platform, MTurk, allows cor-
rupted requesters to reap data without paying [14, 15]. Worse
still, all well-known weaknesses of overtrusted third-parties,
such as single-point failure [16] and tremendous privacy leak-
age [17] remain as serious vulnerabilities in the special case
of crowdsourcing. Let alone the third-party platforms impose
expensive handling charges. For example, MTurk charges a
handling fee up to 45% of overall incentives [18].
New challenges in decentralization. Recognizing those draw-
backs of centralized crowdsourcing, recent attempts [19, 20]
initiated the decentralized crowdsourcing through the newly
emerged blockchain2 technology. Their aim is to “simulate”
a virtual platform that is trustable to enforce the payment
policies, thus removing the vulnerable centralized platforms.
However, as shown in the seminal studies on the blockchain
[21, 22], decentralization through the blockchain also brings
forth a few “new” security challenges, which can render the
incentive mechanisms of HITs completely ineffective [19].
Privacy as a basic requirement. In particular, due to the
transparency of blockchain [21, 22], once some answers are
submitted, any malicious worker can simply copy and re-
submit them to earn rewards without making any real efforts,
which immediately allows free-riding and cracks the basic
fairness of HITs. Namely, the transparent blockchain presents
all workers a new option: running a simple automated script to
“copy-and-paste” other answers submitted to the blockchain,
which was infeasible in previous centralized systems. Having
2Remark that through the paper, blockchain refers to permissionless
blockchain (e.g. Ethereum mainnet) that is open to any Internet node.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
10
07
4v
3 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 Ju
l 2
02
0
the new option of free-riding, rational workers might wait
to copy instead of conducting any efforts. Sorta “tragedy of
the commons” could occur, and eventually no one would
respond with independent answers [23–26]. That said, the
straightforwardly decentralized crowdsourcing could lose all
basic utilities and fail to gather anything meaningful!
Therefore, to make the decentralized crowdsourcing sys-
tems function as desired, privacy becomes an indispensable
requirement instead of an advanced bonus property.
State-of-the-art & open problem. To overcome blockchain’s
inherent limits, prior art [19] proposes the general outsource-
then-prove framework for private decentralized HITs. It en-
ables the requester to prove the quality of answers that are
encrypted to her, without revealing the actual answers. Such a
proof becomes the crux to ensure privacy and simultaneously
deters false-reporting and free-riding. In addition, the feasibil-
ity challenge sprouts up as the blockchain needs to verify the
proof, which means the proof size and verification cost must
be small enough to meet the limited on-chain resources.
For above reasons, prior work relies on some generic zero-
knowledge proof (zk-proof) framework that is succinct in
proof size and efficient for verifying, in particular SNARK3
[29–31] to reduce the on-chain verification cost.
Nonetheless, generic zk-proofs such as SNARK inevitably
inherit low performance for the convenience of achieving
generality, causing that prior private decentralized HITs suffer
from an unbearable off-chain proving cost and a still signifi-
cant on-chain verifying expense:
• Infeasible proving (off-chain). The proving of generic zk-
proofs (e.g., SNARK) seems inherently complex, due to
the burdensome NP-reduction for generality. In particular,
prior study [32] reported 56 GB memory and 2 hours are
needed to prove whether an encrypted answer coincides
with the majority of all encrypted submissions at a
very small scale, e.g., at most eleven answers. Such a
performance prevents the previous protocol from being
usable by any normal requesters using regular PCs.
• Costly verification (on-chain). Existing blockchains (e.g.
Ethereum) are feasible to verify only few types of generic
zk-proofs such as SNARK, whose verification need to
compute a dozen of expensive pairings over elliptic curve
[29–31]. So the on-chain verification of these zk-proofs
is not only computationally costly, but also financially
expensive. Currently in Ethereum, 12 pairings already
spend ∼500k gas [33], and verifying a SNARK proof
costs even more (about half US dollar).
Given the insufficiencies of the state-of-the-art, the follow-
ing critical problem remains open:
How to design a practical private decentralized HITs
protocol for crowdsourcing human knowledge?
3Remark that though the rise of Intel SGX becomes a seemingly enticing
alternative of SNARK to go beyond many limits of blockchain by remote
attestations [27], unfortunately, recent Foreshadow attacks [28] allow the
adversary to forge “attestations” by stealing the attestation key hardcoded in
any SGX Enclave, which seriously challenges the already heavy assumption of
“trusted” hardware, and makes it even more illusive to trust SGX in practice.
Our contributions. To answer the above unresolved problem,
we present a practical private decentralized HITs protocol for
the major tasks of crowdsourcing human knowledge. In sum,
our core technical contributions are three-fold:
• To achieve practical private decentralized HITs, we ex-
plore various non-trivial optimizations to avoid the cum-
bersome generic-purpose zk-proof framework, and reduce
the protocol to the specific verifiable decryption. As such,
we attain concrete improvements by orders of magnitude,
regarding both the proving and verification:
– For proving, our approach is two orders of magnitude
better than generic zk-proof.4 For the same HIT, the
proving in our protocol costs 50 MB memory and 10
msec, while the generic proof costs 10 GB and 2 min.
– For verifying, our result improves upon the generic
solution by nearly an order of magnitude. The on-chain
cost of verifying a proof for the quality of an answer
to 106 batched binary questions is reduced to ∼180k
gas in Ethereum (much smaller than verifying SNARK
proofs) and typically few US cents.
• We further implement our protocol to instantiate a practi-
cal private decentralized crowdsourcing system Dragoon,
the handling cost of which could be even less than the
existing centralized platforms such as MTurk.
Dragoon is launched atop Ethereum to conduct a typical
HIT adopted by ImageNet [12] to solicit large-scale
image annotations. To handle the task, Dragoon attains
an on-chain (handling) cost ∼$2 US dollars at the time
of writing. In comparison, for the same task, the handling
fee of MTurk is at least $4 currently [18, 34].
Our result provides an insight that the on-chain handling
fee (characterizing the users’ financial expense) in the
decentralized setting can approximate or even less than
the handling fee charged by centralized platforms. This
indicates the de facto users can financially benefit from
decentralization, though it is not contradictory to the com-
mon belief [35] that decentralization is more expensive
w.r.t. the overall computational cost of the system.
• Along the way, we firstly formulate the ideal function-
ality of decentralized HITs. The rigorous security model
clearly defines what a HIT shall be and allows us to use
the simulation-based paradigm to prove security against
subtle adversaries in the blockchain.
In contrast, existing decentralized HITs [19, 32] have
quite different property-based definitions on “securities”,
which at least makes the lack of well-defined bench-
mark to compare them. Even worse, many of them are
“flawed”, as failing to capture all respects of the subtle
adversary in the blockchain; for example, they allow the
corrupted requester to reap data without paying, if being
given the standard ability of adversarially re-ordering
message deliveries, while our approach precisely defines
the security requirement against this subtle attack.
4Generic zk-proof refers zk-SNARK in our context, since the only generic
zk-proof that can be feasibly supported by existing blockchains is zk-SNARK.
Challenge & our techniques. The major challenge of making
private decentralized HITs practical is that the blockchain
must learn the quality of some encrypted answers, namely,
to obtain some properties of what a few ciphertext are en-
crypting. The state-of-the-art [19, 32] proposed to reduce the
problem to generic zk-proofs, by observing the requester can
decrypt the answers, and then prove the quality of answers to
the blockchain. But this generic approach incurs impractical
expenses inherently, because of the underlying heavyweight
NP-reduction for generality.
To conquer the above challenge, we follow a different path
that deviates from generic zk-proofs to explore a concretely
efficient solution. At the core of our private decentralized HITs
protocol, we design a special-purpose non-interactive proof
scheme to efficiently attest the quality of encrypted answers,
which removes heavyweight general-purpose zk-proofs and
then avoids the inefficiency of generality.
Statement Reformation
1. Prove upper-bound
2. Particular zero-knowledge
  A concrete crypto
  problem between
  two parties
Reduced to verifiable
decryption by removing
all arithmetic relations
    Generic  
 zk-proofs
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Efficient construction of
verifiable decryption
Abstract real-world HITs
The only quality-based incentive
incorporated by Amazon's MTurk
Concretely
   efficient proof 
of quality
Fig. 1. The path to realizing efficient proofs for encrypted answers’ quality.
The ideas behind our efficient proving scheme are a variety
of special-purpose optimizations to squeeze performance by
removing needless generality, such that we reduce the problem
of proving encrypted answers’ quality from generic-purpose
zk-proof to particular verifiable decryption. As shown in Fig
1, our core ideas are highlighted as:
• Abstracting real-world HITs. The first step is to well
formulate an incentive mechanism widely adopted by
real-world HITs, namely, the only one incorporated by
Amazon’s MTurk [10]. Some golden standard challenges
(i.e., questions with known answers) [7] are mixed with
other questions, so the quality of a worker is determined
by her performance on the golden standards.5
We rigorously define the problem of proving the quality
of encrypted answers for the above incentive mechanism.
So proving the quality of a worker is reducible to a
well-defined two-party problem: where the verifier needs
to output the performance of the worker on a set of
golden standard questions, given only a set of ciphertext
answering these golden standards challenges.
Nevertheless, solving this two-party problem is still chal-
lenging, as it needs to compute the property of what a set
of ciphertext are encrypting. The generic version of the
issue falls into multi-input functional encryption [36, 37],
which is well known for its hardness and has no (nearly)
5This concrete incentive turns to be powerful, say it can capture most
HITs in Amazon’s MTurk (c.f., the official tutorial [10]) and also adopted by
the impactful ImageNet [12] to create large-scale deep learning benchmark.
practical solution so far. We thus conduct the following
optimizations to further reduce the problem.
• Statement reformation. The main obstacle of removing
the generic-purpose zk-proof framework is the arithmetic
relations (i.e., some relationship unrepresentable in the
algebraic domain). So we dedicatedly reform the state-
ment of proving the quality of encrypted answers mainly
in two ways to remove all arithmetic relations.
First, we let the requester to prove the upper bound
of each worker’s quality instead of proving the exact
number, which is a relaxation to the general cases, but
does not abandon any utility, since this property is enough
to prevent any corrupted requester from paying less than
what a worker deserves in our context where the reward is
an increasing function of quality. Second, we realize that
given the system’s public knowledge, a tiny and constant
portion of each worker’s answer (i.e., the part answering
gold standards) is already leaked, since this little portion
is simulatable by the public knowledge; thus we can
explicitly reveal these “already-leaked” information.
The above reformations allow us to reduce the problem of
proving the quality of encrypted answers to standard ver-
ifiable encryption without sacrificing securities/utilities.
• Concretely efficient proving scheme. Following the above
optimizations, the problem eventually is reduced to verifi-
able encryption, which becomes representable in concrete
algebraic relations. Along the way, we present a certain
variant of verifiable decryption that is concretely tailored
for the scenario of HITs where the plaintexts are short,
and thus squeeze most performance out of it and boost
private decentralized HITs practically.
II. OTHER RELATED WORK
Besides existing private decentralized HITs [19, 32] dis-
cussed earlier, here we briefly review some pertinent generic
cryptographic frameworks and discuss their insufficiencies in
the concrete context of private decentralized crowdsourcing.
Privacy-preserving blockchain. A variety of studies [22, 38,
39] consider the general framework for privacy-preserving
blockchain and smart contract. The approaches are powerful in
the sense of their generality, yet are expensive for concrete use-
cases in practice. For example, Hawk [22] leverages generic
zk-proofs to keep blockchain private, but incurs expensive
proving expenses. As such, it is unclear how to leverage these
generic frameworks to design concretely efficient protocol for
the special-purpose of crowdsourcing [19].
Fair MPC using blockchain. Decentralized crowdsourcing is
a special-purpose fair MPC using blockchain. Kiayias, Zhou
and Zikas [21] consider the generic version of fair MPC in
the presence of blockchain, but it is unclear how to adopt their
generic protocol in practice without expensively computational
costs. Recently, increasing interests focus on special-purpose
variants of fair MPC in aid of blockchain. For example, [40–
42] consider poker games. But these special-purpose solutions
are over-tuned for distinct scenarios and are unclear how to
be used for private decentralized crowdsourcing.
Multi-input functional encryption. The core problem of pri-
vate decentralized crowdsourcing is to let the blockchain learn
the quality of encrypted answers, which is straightforwardly
reducible to multi-input functional encryption (MIFE) [36].
But MIFE relies on indistinguishability obfuscation [36] or
multi-linear maps [37], which currently we do not notice how
to instantiate under standard cryptographic assumptions.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Here we briefly review some relevant cryptographic notions.
Following convention, we let $← to denote uniformly sampling
and ≈c to denote computationally indistinguishable.
Cryptocurrency ledger. The cryptocurrency maintained atop
the blockchain instantiates a global bookkeeping ledger (e.g.
denoted by L) to deal with “coin” transfers, transparently. It
can be called out by an ideal functionality (i.e., a standard
model of so-called smart contract [21, 22]) as a subroutine to
assist conditional payments. Formally, cryptocurrency L can
be seen as an ideal functionality interacting with a set of parties
P = {Pi} and the adversary; it stores the balance bi for each
Pi ∈ P , and handles the following oracle queries [22, 43]:
• FreezeCoins. On input (freeze,Pi, b) from an ideal func-
tionality F (i.e. a smart contract), check whether bi ≥ b
and proceed as follows: if the check holds, let bi = bi−b
and bF = bF + b, send (frozen,F ,Pi, b) to every entity;
otherwise, reply with (nofund,Pi, b).
• PayCoins. On input (pay,Pi, b) from an ideal functional-
ity F (i.e. a smart contract), check whether bF ≥ b and
proceed as follows: if that is the case, let bi = bi + b and
bF = bF − b, send (paid,F ,Pi, b) to every entity.
Commitment. The commitment scheme is a two-phase pro-
tocol between a sender and a receiver. In the commit phase,
a sender “hides” a string msg behind a string comm with
using a blinding key, namely, the sender transmits comm =
Commit(msg, key) to the receiver. In the reveal phase, the
receiver gets key′ and msg′ as opening for comm, and executes
Open(comm,msg′, key′) to output 0 (reject) or (1) accept.
Through the paper, we consider computational hiding and
computational binding. The former one requires the commit-
ments of two strings are computationally indistinguishable.
The latter one means the receiver would not accept an opening
to reveal msg′ 6= msg, except with negligible probability.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH). DDH problem is to tell
that d = ab or d $← Zp, given (g, ga, gb, gd) where a, b $← Zp
and g is a generator of a cyclic group G of order p. The DDH
assumption states {(g, ga, gb, gd)} ≈c {(g, ga, gb, gab)}. We
assume DDH assumption holds along with the paper.
Verifiable decryption. We consider a specific verifiable public
key encryption (VPKE) consisting of a tuple of algorithms
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec,ProvePKE,VerifyPKE) with concrete ver-
ifiability to allow the decryptor to produce the plaintext along
with a proof attesting the correct decryption [44].
In short, KeyGen can set up a pair of encryption-decryption
algorithms (Ench,Deck), where h and k are public and private
keys respectively. We let any (Ench,Deck) ← KeyGen(1λ)
to be a public key encryption scheme satisfying semantic
security. For presentation simplicity, we also let (Ench,Deck)
denote the public-secret key pair (h, k). Moreover, for any
(h, k) ← KeyGen(1λ), the ProvePKEk algorithm explicitly
inputs the private key k and the ciphertext c, and outputs
a message m with a proof pi; the VerifyPKEh algorithm
explicitly inputs the public key h and (m, c, pi), and outputs
1/0 to accept/reject the statement that m = Deck(c). Beside,
we let VPKE to satisfy the following extra properties (i.e., a
specifically verifiable decryption):
• Completeness. Pr[VerifyPKEh(m, c, pi) = 1 | (m,pi) ←
ProvePKEk(c)] = 1, for ∀ c and (h, k)← KeyGen(1λ);
• Soundness. For any (h, k) ← KeyGen(1λ) and c, any
probabilistic polynomial-time (P.P.T.) A cannot produce
pi fooling VerifyPKEh to accept that c is decrypted to m
′
if m′ 6= Deck(c), with except negligible probability;
• Zero-knowledge. The proof pi can be simulated by a P.P.T.
simulator SVPKE, on input only public knowledge m, h
and c that indeed satisfy (m, c, h) ∈ LVPKE := {~x :=
(m, c, h) | m = Deck(c) ∧ (h, k)← KeyGen(1λ)}
Random oracle. We treat the cryptographic hash function as
a global and programmable random oracle [45] and denote the
hash function with H through the paper.
Simulation-based paradigm. To formalize and prove security,
a real world and an ideal world can be defined and compared:
(i) in the real world, there is an actual protocol Π among the
parties, some of which can be corrupted by an adversaryA; (ii)
in the ideal world, an “imaginary” trusted ideal functionality
F replaces the protocol and interacts with honest parties and a
simulator S. We say that Π securely realizes F , if for ∀ P.P.T.
adversary A in the real-world, ∃ a P.P.T. simulator S in the
ideal-world, s.t. the two worlds cannot be distinguished, which
means: no P.P.T. distinguisher D can attain non-negligible
advantage to distinguish “the joint distribution over the outputs
of honest parties and the adversary A in the real world” from
“the joint distribution over the outputs of honest parties and
the simulator S in the ideal world”.
Moreover, we consider the static adversary who can corrupt
some parties before the protocol starts. The advantage of
simulation-based paradigm is that all desired behaviors of the
protocol can be precisely described by the ideal functionality.
Remarkably, this approach has been widely adopted to analyze
decentralized protocols [21, 22, 40] to capture the subtle
adversary in the blockchain.
IV. FORMALIZATION OF DECENTRALIZED HUMAN
INTELLIGENT TASKS
This section rigorously defines our security model, by giving
the ideal functionality of Human Intelligent Tasks (HITs) that
captures the security/utility requirements of the state-of-the-
art HITs in reality [2–15]. Our security modeling sets forth a
clear security goal, that is: the HITs in the real world shall be
as “secure” as the HITs in an admissible ideal world.
Reviewing the HITs in reality. Let us briefly review the HITs
adopted in reality [2–15], before presenting our abstraction of
their ideal functionality.
Parties & process flow. There are two explicit roles in a
HIT, i.e., the requester and some workers.6 The requester,
uniquely identified by R, can post a task T to collect a
certain amount of answers. In the task, R also promises a
concrete reward policy. The worker with a unique identifier
Wj , submits his answer aj to expect receive the reward.
Task design. A HIT consists of a sequence of questions
denoted by T = (q1, · · · , qN ), where each qi is a multiple
choice question and N is the number of questions in the
task. The answer of each question must lay in a particular
range ⊂ N ∪ 0 pre-specified when T is published.
The above HIT design is based on batched choice ques-
tions, which follows real-world practices [2–15] to remove
ambiguity, thus letting workers precisely understand the task.
For example, Fei-fei Li et al. [2, 12, 47] used the technique
to create the deep learning benchmark ImageNet, and Andrew
Ng et al. [3] suggested it for language annotations.
Answer quality. The quality of an answer is induced by a
function Quality(aj ; sp), where aj = (a(1,j), · · · , a(N,j)) is
the answer submitted by worker Wj , and sp is some secret
parameters of requester. The output of Quality(·) is denoted
by χj , which is said to be the quality of worker Wj .
The above abstraction captures the quality-based incentive
mechanism adopted by real-world HITs in Amazon’s MTurk
[10–13]. For example, a task T consists of N questions, out
of which M questions are golden-standard questions that are
“secretly” mixed. The quality of a worker can be computed,
due to her accuracy in the M golden-standard questions.
Formally, in the qualify function Quality(aj ; sp), the param-
eter sp = (G,GS), where G ( [1, N ] represents the randomly
chosen indexes of the golden-standard questions, and GS =
{si|si ∈ range}i∈G represents the known answers of the
golden-standard questions. Following the real-world practices
[10–13], the quality of an answer aj = (a(1,j), · · · , a(N,j)) is:
Quality(aj , (G,GS)) =
∑
i∈G
[a(i,j)≡si]
where [·] is Iverson bracket to convert any logic proposition
to 1 if the proposition is true and 0 otherwise.
Defining the decentralized HITs’ functionality. Now we are
ready to present our security notion of HITs in the presence of
cryptocurrency. We formalize the ideal functionality of HITs
(denoted by Fhit) in the L-hybrid model as shown in Fig 2.
Intuitively, FLhit abstracts a special-purpose multi-party secure
6There is an implicit registration authority (RA), who is required by real-
world crowdsourcing platforms e.g. MTurk to prevent adversary forging a
large number of identities (a.k.a. Sybil attackers). In practice, RAs can be
instantiated by (i) the platform itself (e.g., MTurk), and (ii) the certificate
authority who provides authentication service. Our solution can inherit these
established RAs, and we therefore omits such the implicit RAs, with assuming
all identities are granted. If the participants are interested in anonymity,
anonymous-yet-accountable authentication scheme [19, 46] can be used;
however, those are orthogonal techniques out scope of this paper.
The ideal functionality of HIT FLhit
Given accesses to oracle L, the functionality FLhit interacts with a
requester R, a set of workers {Wj} and adversary S.
Phase 1: Publish Task
• Upon receiving (publish, N,B,K, range,Θ, G,GS) from R,
leak (publishing,R, N,B,K, range,Θ, |G|, |GS |) to S, until the
beginning of next clock period, proceed with the following
delayed executions:
– send (freeze,Pi,B) to L, if return (frozen,FLhit,Pi,B):
* store N , B, K, Range, χ¯ and sp as internal states;
* initialize answers← ∅, and goto next phase;
Phase 2: Collect Answers
• Upon receiving (answer,aj) from Wj , leak the message
(answering,Wj , |aj |) to S, till receiving (approved) from S,
continue with the delayed executions down below:
– if (Wj , ·) ∈ answers, do nothing;
– else, answers← answers∪(Wj ,aj), send answers to R, leak
(Wj , |aj |) to S, go to phase 3 if |answers| = K.
Phase 3: Evaluate Answers
• Upon entering this phase, leak all received messages to S, until
the beginning of next clock period, proceed to run the following
delayed executions for each Wj ∈ {Wj | (Wj , ·) ∈ answers}:
– if receiving (evaluate,Wj) from R, proceed as:
* check whether Quality(aj , (G,GS)) ≥ Θ, if that
is the case, send (pay,Wj ,B/K) to L, and leak
(evaluated,Wj , G,GS) to all entities including S;
– if receiving (outrange,Wj , i) from R, proceed as:
* if a(i,j) /∈ range, leak (outranged,Wj , a(i,j)) to all
entities, otherwise send (pay,Wj ,B/K) to L.
– else, no message from R was received, proceed as:
* if aj 6= ⊥, send (pay,Wj ,B/K) to L.
Fig. 2. The (stateful) ideal functionality of coin-aided HIT FLhit. The blue text
shows FLhit is proceeding synchronously as the adversary can delay message
deliveries up to next clock period [21, 22]; the brown text means that FLhit has
to proceed asynchronously as if the adversary can arbitrarily delay messages.
computation, in which: (i) a requester recruits K workers to
crowdsource some knowledge, and (ii) each worker gets a
payment of B/K from the requester, if submitting an answer
meeting the minimal quality standard Θ.
In greater detail, the ideal functionality Fhit of HITs im-
mediately implies the following security properties:
• Fairness. Our ideal functionality captures a strong notion
of fairness, that means: the worker get paid, if and only
if s/he puts forth a qualified answer (instead of copying
and pasting somewhere else). In greater detail, the re-
quester specifies a sequence of N multi-choice questions,
which are multi-choice questions having some options
in range and contain |G| gold-standard challenges.7 For
each worker, s/he has to (i) meet a pre-specified quality
standard Θ and (ii) submit answers in the range of
options, in order to receive the pre-defined payment B/K.
7We explicitly consider that |G| and range are small constant in the
HITs ideal functionality. Such modeling follows real-world practices [2–15].
In particular, |range| is a small constant in practice, because it represents few
options of each multi-choice question in HIT; and |G| is also a small constant,
as it represents few gold-standard challenges in a HIT task.
• Audibility of gold-standards. The choice of golden stan-
dards is up to the requester, so it becomes a realistic worry
that a malicious requester uses some bogus as the answers
of golden standard questions. The ideal functionality aims
to abstract the best prior art [14, 15] regarding this
issue so far, that means the golden standards become
public auditable once the HIT is done. This abstraction
“simulates” the ad-hoc reputation systems maintained by
the MTurk workers to grade the reputations of the MTurk
requesters in reality [14, 15].
• Confidentiality. It means any worker cannot learn the
advantage information during the course of protocol exe-
cution. Without the property, workers can copy and paste
to free ride, so it is a minimal requirement to ensure the
usefulness of decentralized HITs. Our ideal functionality
naturally captures the property.
Adversary. We consider probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary in the real world. It can corrupt the requester and/or
some workers statically, before the real-world protocol begins.
The uncorrupted parties are said to be honest. Following the
standard blockchain model [21, 22], we also abstract the ability
of the real-world adversary to control the communication (be-
tween the blockchain and honest parties) as: (i) it follows the
synchrony assumption [22, 48], namely, we let there is a global
clock [22, 48], and the adversary can delay any messages sent
to the blockchain up to a-priori known time (w.l.o.g., up to
the next clock); (ii) the adversary can manipulate the order of
so-far-undelivered messages sent to the blockchain, which is
known as the “rushing” adversary.
Expressivity of HITs’ ideal functionality. The ideal func-
tionality Fhit not only captures the elegant state-of-the-art of
collecting image/language/video annotations [2–4, 11–13, 47]
but also reflects the common scenario of crowdsourcing human
knowledge. Consider the next example: Alice is running a
small startup, and aims to provide a service to visualize the
availabilities of street parkings. Unfortunately, at each mo-
ment, Alice only knows the availabilities of street parkings at
quite few spots, since she cannot afford the cost of monitoring
every corner around the city. The little a-priori knowledge of
Alice is her “golden standards”, and such information is too
little to boost a useful service. So Alice can crowdsource more
street parking information from a few workers, with using her
few golden standards to control the quality of solicited data.
In light of the above discussion, it is fair to say that our
abstraction is expressive to capture most real-world practices
of crowdsourcing human knowledge (e.g. HITs in MTurk).
V. HITS PROTOCOL AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section elaborates our practical protocol for decentral-
ized HITs. We begin with an important building block for
proving the quality of encrypted answers. Then we showcase
the smart contract functionality Chit that interacts with the
workers and the requester. Later, the detailed protocol is given
in the presence of Chit. We finally prove that our protocol
securely realizes the ideal functionality Fhit of HITs.
A. Proof of quality of encrypted answer (PoQoEA)
The core building block of our novel decentralized protocol
is to allow the requester efficiently prove the quality of en-
crypted answers. We formally define this concrete purpose to
set forth the notion of PoQoEA, and then present an efficient
reduction from it to verifiable decryption (VPKE).
Defining PoQoEA. The problem we are addressing here is to
prove that: an encrypted answer cj can be decrypted to obtain
some aj s.t. the quality of aj is χ, without leaking anything
other than cj , χ and the parameters of quality function.
To capture the problem, the state-of-the-art [19, 22] adopts
the standard notion of zk-proof in order to support generic
quality measurements. Different from existing solutions, we
particularly tailor the notion of zk-proof to obtain a fine-tuned
notion of PoQoEA for the widely adopted quality function
defined in §IV. Namely, we consider Quality(· ;G,Gs) where
G is the index of gold-standards and Gs = {si}i∈G is the
ground truth of golden standards, and aim to remove the
unnecessary generality in the concrete setting.
Precisely, given the quality function Quality(· ;G,Gs) and
any established public key encryption scheme (Ench,Deck)←
KeyGen(1λ), we can define PoQoEA as a tuple of hereunder
algorithms (ProveQualityk,VerifyQualityh):
1) ProveQualityk(cj , χ,G,Gs) → pi. Given the encrypted
answer cj = (c1,j , . . . , cN,j), the quality χ, and the
golden standards (G, Gs), it outputs a proof pi attesting
χ is the quality of cj ; the algorithm explicitly takes the
secret decryption key k as input;
2) VerifyQualityh(cj , χ, pi,G,Gs) → 0/1. It outputs 0 (re-
ject) or 1 (accept), according to whether pi is a valid
proof attesting χ is the actual quality of cj ; the algorithm
explicitly takes the public encryption key h as input;
Moreover, PoQoEA shall satisfy the following properties:
• Completeness. PoQoEA is complete, if for any G, Gs, cj ,
χ and (Ench,Deck) s.t. χ = Quality(Deck(cj);G,Gs),
there is Pr[VerifyQualityh(cj , χ, pi,G,Gs) = 1 | pi ←
ProveQualityk(cj , χ,G,Gs)] = 1;
• “Upper-bound” soundness. PoQoEA is upper-bound
sound, if for any G, Gs, cj , χ and (Ench,Deck), for ∀
P.P.T. A, there is Pr[VerifyQualityh(cj , χ, pi′, G,Gs) =
1 ∧ χ < Quality(aj ;G,Gs) ∧ aj = Deck(cj) |
pi′ ← A(G,Gs, χ, cj , λ,Ench,Deck)] ≤ negl(λ), where
negl(λ) is a negligible function in λ; so it is computa-
tionally infeasible to produce a valid proof, if χ is not
the upper bound of the quality of what cj is encrypting;
• “Special” zero-knowledge. Conditioned on |G| and the
range of elements in Gs are small constants, for any
G, Gs, cj , χ and (Deck,Ench), ∃ a P.P.T. simulator S
that can simulate the communication scripts of PoQoEA
protocol on input only h, G, Gs, cj , and χ.
Rationale behind the finely-tuned abstraction. The notion
of PoQoEA is defined to remove needless generality in the
special case of HITs. Compared to the state-of-the-art notion
[19], PoQoEA is more promising to be efficiently constructed,
as it brings the following definitional advantages:
• We adopt “upper-bound” soundness to ensure that any
probably corrupted requester cannot forge the upper
bound of quality of each worker. Such the tuning stems
from a basic fact that: the reward of a worker is an
increasing function in quality, so the upper bound of the
worker’s quality at least reflects the well-deserved reward
of the worker. As a result, any cheating requester has to
pay at least as much as the honest requester.
• Another major difference is the relaxed special zero-
knowledge: PoQoEA is zero-knowledge, only if |G| and
range are small constants, so anything simulatable by the
gold standards can be leaked. Nevertheless, the conditions
are prevalent in the special context of HITs [2–15]. Recall
that G represents the few golden standard questions, and
range means the few options of each question in HITs,
indicating that both are small constants in reality.
In sum, even though PoQoEA is seemingly over-tuned, it
essentially coincides with the generic zk-proof of the quality
of encrypted answers in the context of HITs.
Construction and security analysis. Here is an efficiency-
driven way to constructing PoQoEA for the quality function
Quality(aj ;G,Gs) that was defined in §IV. We can reduce
the problem to the standard notion of verifiable decryp-
tion. More precisely, given the established VPKE scheme
(Ench,Deck,ProvePKEk,VerifyPKEh), PoQoEA can be con-
structed as illustrated in Fig 3.
ProveQuality(~x, k) VerifyQuality(~x)
Public knowledge ~x: G, Gs = {si}i∈G, χ, c = 〈c1 . . . cN 〉, h
pi ← ∅
for each i in G:
(ai, pii)← ProvePKEk(c)
if ai 6= si:
pi ← pi ∪ (i, ai, pii)
output pi
for each (i, ai, pii) in pi:
if ai ≡ si:
output 0
if ¬VerifyPKEh(ai, ci, pi):
output 0
χ← χ+ 1
output 1 : 0? χ ≥ |G|
pi
Fig. 3. The construction of PoQoEA for the quality defined in §IV.
Lemma 1. Given any verifiable public key encryption VPKE,
the algorithm in Fig 3 satisfies the definition of PoQoEA
regarding the quality function defined in §IV.
Proof. (sketch) The completeness is immediate from the def-
inition of quality function, the correctness of encryption, and
the completeness of VPKE. To prove the upper-bound sound-
ness, we assume by contradiction to let an adversary break
it, then the adversary can immediately break the soundness of
VPKE. The special zero-knowledge is also clear: considering
|G| and the range of each ai are constants, the permutation(|G|
χ
)
would be constant, indicating that there exists a P.P.T.
simulator S invoking at most polynomial number of SVPKE
(on input ci, h, and guessed ai ∈ range \ {si}) to simulate all
VPKE proofs [49], thus simulating the PoQoEA proof.
The HITs contract functionality C Lhit
Given accesses to L, Chit interacts with R, {Wj}, and A.
Phase 1: Publish Task
• Upon receiving (publish, N,B,K, range,Θ, h, commgs) from
R, leak the message and R to A, until the beginning of next
clock, proceed with the delayed executions down below:
– send (freeze,Pi,B) to L, if returns (frozen,FLhit,Pi,B):
* store N , B, K, range, Θ, h and commgs
* initialize answers ← ∅, comms ← ∅
* send (published,R, N,B,K, range,Θ, h, commgs) to all
entities, and goto phase 2-a
Phase 2-a: Collect Answers (Commit phase)
• Upon receiving (commit, commcj ) fromWj , leak the message
and Wj to A, then proceed with the following delayed execu-
tions until the beginning of next clock, with consulting A to
re-order all received commit messages:
– for each received commit message (sent from Wj):
* if (Wj , ·) /∈ comms and (·, commcj ) /∈ comms:
· let comms← comms ∪ (Wj , commcj )· if |comms| = K, send (committed, comms) to all
entities, and goto the reveal phase
Phase 2-b: Collect Answers (Reveal phase)
• Upon entering this phase, leak all received messages and their
senders to A, till the next clock period, proceed as:
– for each Wj ∈ {Wj | (Wj , ·) ∈ comms}:
* if receiving the message (reveal, cj , keyj) from Wj such
that Open(commcj , cj , keyj) = 1:
· answers ← answers ∪ (Wj , cj)
* else answers ← answers ∪ (Wj ,⊥)
– send (revealed, answers) to all, and goto the next phase
Phase 3: Evaluate Answers
• Upon entering this phase, leak all received messages and their
senders to A, till the next clock period, proceed as:
– if receiving (golden, G,Gs, keygs) from R, such that
Open(commsgs, G||Gs, keygs) = 1:
* for each Wj ∈ {Wj | (Wj , ·) ∈ answers}:
· if receiving (outrange,Wj , i, a(i,j), pii) from R:
send (pay,Wj ,B/K) to L, if a(i,j) ∈ range or
VerifyPKEh(a(i,j), c(i,j), pii) = 0
· else if receiving (evaluate,Wj , χj , pi) from R:
send (pay,Wj ,B/K) to L, if χj ≥ Θ or
VerifyQualityh(cj , χj , pi,G,Gs) = 0
· else if cj 6= ⊥, send (pay,Wj ,B/K) to L
– otherwise, for each Wj ∈ {Wj | (Wj , ·) ∈ answers}, send
(pay,Wj ,B/K) to L
Fig. 4. The ideal functionality of the (stateful) HITs contract.
B. HIT contract and HIT protocol
Now we are ready to present our concretely efficient decen-
tralized protocol Πhit for HIT. Our design centers around a
smart contract C Lhit, which is formally described in Fig 4. The
contract C Lhit is the crux to take best advantage of the rather
limited abilities of blockchain to make our protocol securely
realize the ideal functionality FLhit. Thus given contract C Lhit,
our HITs protocol Πhit can be defined among the requester,
the worker and the contract, as formally illustrated in Fig 5.
Informally, our HIT protocol Πhit proceeds as follows:
1) Publish task. The requester R announces her public key
h, and publishes a task T of N multi-choice questions
to crowdsource K answers for the task. Each question in
T is specified to have some options in range. The task
mixes some golden standard questions, whose indexes G
and ground truth Gs are committed to commgs. Also, R
places B as deposit to cover her budget, which promises
that a worker would get a reward of B/K, if submitting
an answer beyond a specified quality standard Θ.
2) Commit answers. Once the task is published, the workers
can commit their answers (encrypted to the requester)
in the task. To prevent against copy-and-paste attacks,
duplicated commitments are rejected. The contract moves
to the next phase, once K distinct workers commit.
3) Reveal answers. After K workers commit their answers,
these workers can start to reveal their answers in form
of ciphertexts encrypted to the requester. Note that the
submissions of answers explicitly contain two subphases,
namely, committing and revealing, which is the crux to
prevent the network adversary from taking advantages by
adversarially scheduling the order of submissions.
4) Evaluate answers. Eventually, the requester is supposed
to instruct the blockchain to correctly pay these encrypted
answers to facilitate the critical fairness. To this end, the
protocol leverages our novel notion of PoQoEA. So the
requester can efficiently prove to the contract to reject
a certain answer, if the worker does not meet the pre-
specified quality standard Θ. If an answer is out of the
specified range, the requester is allowed to use verifiable
encryption VPKE to reveal that to reject payment.
Remark. C Lhit captures the essence of smart contracts [50]
in reality, as it: (i) reflects the transparency of Turing-complete
smart contract that is a stateful program handling pre-specified
tasks publicly; (ii) captures a contract that can access the
cryptocurrency ledger to honestly deal with conditional pay-
ments; (iii) models the network adversary who is consulted to
schedule the delivering order of so-far-undelivered messages.
C. Instantiating cryptographic building blocks
For sake of completeness, we hereafter give the construc-
tions of cryptographic building blocks. Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic
group of prime order p, where g is a random generator of G.
(Short range) verifiable decryption is based on exponential
ElGamal. The private key k $← Zp, the public key h = gk,
the encryption Ench(m) = (c1, c2) = (gr, gmhr), and the
decryption Deck((c1, c2)) = log(c2/ck1) where log is to brute-
force the short plaintext range to obtain m; if decryption fails
to output m ∈ range, then c2/ck1 is returned. In addition, to
efficiently augment the above (Ench,Deck) to be verifiable,
we adopt a variant of Schnorr protocol [51] (for Diffie-
Hellman tuples) with Fiat-Shamir transform in the random
oracle model. In detail,
• ProvePKEk((c1, c2)). Run Deck((c1, c2)) to obtain m ∈
range (or gm if m /∈ range). Let x $← {0, 1}λ. Compute
A = cx1 , B = g
x, C = H(A||B||g||h||c1||c2||gm), Z =
The protocol of HITs Πhit
Πhit is among the requester R, the workers {Wj} and Chit
Phase 1: Publish Task
• Requester R:
– (Ench,Deck)← KeyGen(1λ)
– Upon receiving the parameters G, Gs, Θ, N , range, B, K
of a HIT to publish:
* keysg
$← {0, 1}λ
* commgs ← Commit(G||Gs, keysg)
* send (publish, N,B,K, range,Θ, h, commgs) to Chit
Phase 2: Collect Answers
• Worker Wj :
– Upon receiving (published,R, N,B,K, range,Θ, h, commgs)
from Chit:
* get the answer aj = (a(1,j), · · · , a(N,j))
* cj ← (Ench(a(1,j)), · · · ,Ench(a(1,N)))
* commcj ← Commit(cj , keyj), where keyj $← {0, 1}λ
* send (commit, commcj ) to Chit
– Upon receiving (committed, comms) from Chit:
* if (Wj , ·) ∈ comms, send (reveal, cj , keyj) to Chit
Phase 3: Evaluate Answers
• Requester R:
– Upon receiving (revealed, answers) from Chit:
* send (golden, G,Gs, keygs) to R
* for each (Wj , cj) ∈ answers:
· decrypt each item in cj to get aj = (a(1,j), · · · , a(N,j))
· if ∃a(i,j) ∈ aj s.t. a(i,j) /∈ range:
· (a(i,j), pii)← ProvePKEk(c(i,j))
· send (outrange,Wj , i, a(i,j), pii) to Chit
· else if χj = Quality(Dec(cj , skR);G,Gs) < Θ:
· pi ← ProveQualityk(cj , χj , G,Gs)· send (evaluate,Wj , χj , pi) to Chit
Fig. 5. The formal description of the decentralized HITs protocol Πhit.
x+kC, and pi = (A,B,Z). If m ∈ range, output (m,pi);
else, output (gm, pi).
• VerifyPKEh(M, (c1, c2), pi). Parse pi = (A,B,Z). If
M ∈ range, compute C ′ = H(A||B||g||h||c1||c2||gM ),
and then verify gM ·C
′ · cZ1 ≡A · cC
′
2 and g
Z ≡ B · hC′ ,
output 1 if the verification passes and 0 otherwise; else
if M ∈ G, compute C ′ = H(A||B||g||h||c1||c2||M) and
verify MC
′ · cZ1 ≡A · cC
′
2 ∧ gZ ≡ B · hC
′
, output 1 iff the
verification passes and 0 otherwise.
Proof of quality of encrypted answer is built by invoking
the above VPKE construction in a black-box manner, due to
our reduction from PoQoEA to VPKE in §V-A.
Commitment scheme is instantiated according to the well-
known efficient folklore construction in the random oracle
model [45, 52]: (i) Commit(msg, key) = H(msg||key); (ii)
Open(comm,msg′, key′) = [H(msg′||key′) ≡ comm], where
[·] is Iverson bracket from a proposition to 1 (true) or 0 (false).
D. Security analysis
Theorem 1. Conditioned on the hardness of DDH problem
and static corruptions, the stand-alone instance of Πhit se-
curely realizes Fhit in C Lhit-hybrid, random oracle model.
Proof. (sketch) Let C denote the set of corrupted parties
controlled by the adversary A, and let H denote the set of
rest honest parties. For any P.P.T. adversary A in the real
world, we can sketch a P.P.T. simulator S in the ideal world to
interact with the ideal functionality Fhit and corrupted parties,
such that S can emulate the actions of honest parties and the
contract Chit. Detailedly, S proceeds as follows:
• Publish Task (Phase 1). If R ∈ C, considering that the
corrupted R sends the publish message to Chit in the real
world, S can trivially simulate that with interacting with
Fhit. If R ∈ H, when the honest R sends the publish
message to Fhit, S is informed and thus allows S to
simulate the real-world scripts of publish task.
• Collect Answers (Phase 2). In the real world, the P.P.T.
adversary A might: (i) corrupt a set of parties C up to
including the requester and a set of the workers, and (ii) is
also consulted to reorder the so-far-undelivered messages
sent to Chit (till the next clock).
The basic strategy to emulate A is that: S invokes the
adversary A to obtain how A is re-ordering the commit
messages (sent from workers), let W to represent the set
of workers whose commit messages are scheduled as the
first K to deliver; then S delays all answer messages that
are not sent from the workers in W. Then, S internally
simulates the ciphertexts sent via reveal messages to open
commitments. If R ∈ H, the ciphertexts can be simulated
as they are indistinguishable from the uniform distribution
over the ciphertext space; if R ∈ C, S is informed about
all answer submissions sent from the workers, thus can
internally simulate the submissions of the workers in the
real world.
Moreover, if A corrupts a worker whose commit message
is scheduled in the first K to deliver but does not send any
the reveal message to open the commitment, the simulator
S can simulate that since it can let the corrupted worker
to send an answer message containing ⊥ with Fhit. In
addition, it is trivial to see S can internally simulate the
parties as well as Chit, when the adversary A corrupts a
worker to submit duplicated commitment.
• Evaluate Answers (Phase 3). The simulation becomes
clear, if considering the security requirements of com-
mitment scheme, VPKE, and PoQoEA. If the requester
R ∈ C, the simulator S invokes A to obtain all outrange
and/or evaluate messages sent to Chit, and then simulates
the interactions. If the requester R ∈ H, whenever R
sends outrange and/or evaluate messages to Fhit, S is
informed and hence is allowed to simulate the interactions
between Chit and R in the real world.
VI. Dragoon: IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
To demonstrate the feasibility of our protocol, we implement
it to build Dragoon, and then use the system to launch a typical
image annotation task for ImangeNet [12, 47] atop Ethereum.
System overview. Dragoon consists of an on-chain part and
an off-chain part: the on-chain smart contract is deployed in
Ethereum ropsten network; the requester client and worker
clients are implemented in Python 3.6. The off-chain clients
are installed in a PC that uses Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and equips
Intel Xeon E3-1220V2 CPU and 16 GB main memory.
ImageNet’s HIT task. We demonstrate our system through
an ImageNet task [12, 47], which is specified as: each task
is made of 106 binary questions, 100 out of which are non-
gold-standard questions, while the remaining 6 questions are
requester’s gold-standard challenges; 4 workers are allowed
to participate; if a worker cannot correctly answer at least
four golden standard questions, his submission will be rejected
without being paid, otherwise he deserves to get the payment.
Cryptographic modules. The hash function is instantiated
by keccak256. We choose the cyclic group G by using the G1
subgroup of BN-128 elliptic curve, over which all concrete
public key primitives are instantiated.
Code availability. The code of our prototype is available at
https://github.com/njit-bc/dragoon. An experiment instance is
atop Ethereum ropsten network (https://ropsten.etherscan.io/a
ddress/0x5481b096c78c8e09c1bfbf694e934637f7d66698).
Fig. 6. The schematic diagram of Dragoon at a high-level.
Implementation details. Many non-trivial on- and off-chain
optimizations are particularly made for practicability.
Off-chain ends. The requester end warps: (i) an Ethereum
node to interact with the blockchain, e.g. publish task, down-
load workers’ submissions, etc; (ii) the prover of verifiable
encryption to generate necessary proofs to instruct the contract
to reward workers; (iii) a Swarm API to publish the detailed
questions of each crowdsourcing task. Swarm [53] is an off-
chain storage network, where the questions of HIT is stored;
in addition, to ensure integrity of HIT questions, the digest of
the questions is committed in the contract, which significantly
reduces on-chain cost, without violating securities.
The worker client wraps Ethereum to interact with the
blockchain to read task and submit answers, and also incor-
porates Swarm client to allow download task questions.
On-chain optimizations. We cautiously perform a few non-
trivial system-level optimizations to lighten the task contract:
(i) we implement all public key schemes over G1 subgroup of
BN-128 [54], since we can use some precompiled contracts
in Ethereum to do algebraic operations there cheaply [33]; (ii)
it is expensive to store ciphertexts in the contract as internal
variables, so we make the contract store their 256-bit hashes
instead and let the actual ciphertexts included in the chain as
emitted event logs [50].
Evaluations. We conduct intensive experiments to measure
the concrete performance, and discuss the system feasibilities
from the on-chain side and the off-chain side.
Off-chain costs. First, Dragoon enables the requester to
manage only one private-public key pair throughout all her
tasks, because all protocol scripts are simulatable without se-
cret key and therefore leak nothing relevant. More importantly,
the off-chain cost of proving relevant cryptographic proofs is
significantly reduced by removing unnecessary generality.
TABLE I
OFF-CHAIN Proving Cost OF VPKE AND PoQoEA DUE TO OUR
CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIONS AND GENERIC ZK-PROOFS RESPECTIVELY.
Statement to Prove Time Peak Memory
Ours
VPKE 3 ms 53 MB
PoQoEA 10 ms 53 MB
Generic ZKP
∗ VPKE 37 s 3.9 GB
PoQoEA 112 s 10.3 GB
* Through our evaluations, generic zk-proofs are instantiated by zk-SNARK, which is
the only generic zk-proof feasibly supported by existing blockchains to our knowledge.
Table I clarifies the requester suffers from hindersome off-
chain burden of generating generic zk-proofs. The concrete
construction removes the bottleneck of proving in generic zk-
proof. First, the requester can generate a proof to reject a
worker’s submission within only a few milliseconds, which
costs nearly 2 minutes if using generic zk-proof. Second, the
concretely efficient constructions also save in memory usage.
For example, by generic zk-proof, rejecting a submission
requires a peak memory usage of 10 GB, which is reduced
to only 53 MB by concrete constructions.
On-chain costs. We measure the critical on-chain perfor-
mance from many angles including the cost of verifying zk-
proofs and the on-chain gas usage of the whole protocol.
First, we compare the verifying cost of concrete and generic
constructions for VPKE and PoQoEA (six golden standards) in
Table II. The concrete proofs are faster, even compared to the
generic zk-proof (SNARK) known for efficient verification.
TABLE II
ON-CHAIN Verification Cost OF VPKE AND PoQoEA DUE TO OUR
CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIONS AND GENERIC ZK-PROOFS, RESPECTIVELY.
Statement to Verify Verifying Time
Ours
† VPKE 1 ms
PoQoEA 2 ms
Generic ZKP
‡ VPKE 11 ms
PoQoEA 17 ms
† Here the implementation of BN-128 curve is from https://github.com/scipr-lab/libff.
‡ The evaluations for generic ZKP (SNARK) are performed due to constructions from
2048-bit RSA-OAEP over Zpq instead of ElGamal over the G1 subgroup of BN-128.
Moreover, the overall handling fee of running a concrete
ImageNet instance is summarized in Table III. To estimate the
cost of on-chain usages, we apply a gas price at 1.5 × 10−9
Ether per gas, and an Ether price at 115 USD per Ether, which
are the safe-low price of gas [55] and the market price of Ether
on March/17th/2020, respectively. Under the above exchange
rate, the on-chain handling fee paid by each worker is about
$0.48, which is used to submit an answer. In addition, thanks
to the efficient verification of PoQoEA, the requester can spend
few cents to reject each low-quality answer. The overall on-
chain handling cost of the entire HIT is about two US dollars.
In contrast, when MTurk facilitates the same ImageNet task,
it charges a handling fee at least $4 currently [18, 34].
TABLE III
ON-CHAIN Overall Handling Fees OF A CONCRETE IMAGENET TASK
(TASK POLICY: 4 WORKERS; 106 QUESTIONS; 6 GOLD-STANDARDS; A
SUBMISSION IS REJECTED IF FAILING IN 3 GOLD-STANDARDS)
Handling fee of Gas Usage In USD
Publish task (by requester) ∼1293 k $0.22
Submit answers (by worker) ∼2830 k $0.48
Verify PoQoEA to reject an answer ∼180 k $0.03
Overall (best-case: reject no submission) ∼12164 k $2.09
Overall (worst-case: reject all submissions) ∼12877 k $2.22
To summarize, Dragoon is practical. Our experiment even
reveals that Dragoon’s on-chain handling cost can be econom-
ically cheaper than the the handling fee charged by third-party
platforms such as MTurk. In addition, Dragoon is compatible
with many alternative chains (e.g., Cardano, Ethereum Classic
and more) other than Ethereum, as long as the blockchains
are using Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) as the running
environment of smart contracts. So our system can be deployed
in these alternative chains to further reduce the handling cost.
VII. CONCLUSION
We design a decentralized protocol to crowdsource human
knowledge, which, to our knowledge, is the first system in its
kind that realizes both rigorous security and high efficiency.
Open problems. It hints that the special-purpose protocols are
promising to decentralize various crowdsourcing with high-
security assurance as well as efficiency. It immediately corre-
sponds to a few realistic problems to explore. For example,
can we design a concretely efficient protocol to decentralize
participatory crowd-sensing that is minimally meaningful with
the needed fairness and privacy? Such the problem is chal-
lenging, since there seems no explicit requester to “prove” the
quality of encrypted data anymore. Unfortunately, letting the
blockchain learn encrypted data’s quality (without a prover)
falls into the category of (multi-input) functional encryption,
which is unclear how can be solved practically till today.
Another fundamental problem is that we consider security
due to conventional cryptographic notions, where corrupted
parties are fully controlled by an adversary and honest parties
follow the protocol independently. The model has an inherent
drawback to explain why rational workers would not deviate
(e.g., by colluding). To resolve the concern, an “incentive-
compatible” protocol is required, so “following the protocol”
is a Nash equilibrium (or its refinement) that can deter rational
workers from deviating.
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